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Background: The latest amendment to the ban on smoking in public places in Israel was implemented in 2007,
adding pubs and bars (P&B) to the list of public places in which smoking is prohibited. However, smoking in most
P&B continued. The aim of the study was to identify the theoretically plausible reasons for the partial success of a
public ban on smoking in P&B settings. Explanations provided by P&B owners were interpreted as probable causal
factors based on the Behavioral Ecological Model (BEM).
Methods: Qualitative interviews were performed with 36 P&B owners in Tel-Aviv and 18 Israeli towns and cities of
various population size.
Results: P&B owners reported a variety of situational factors (i.e., contingencies) and reinforcers as likely
explanations of the partial failure of the legislated ban on smoking in public places, particularly P&B. The major
reinforcers for non-adherence with the law were no or low frequency of inspections and low penalties from
authorities. P&B owners also feared loss of customers and revenue if bans were enforced in their own
establishment but not in competing establishments. Finally, owners reported social norms prevailing among some
Israeli patrons supporting smoking in P&B settings, in part to express opposition to the new law.
Conclusions: Qualitative assessment can uncover probable social situations that operate to prevent greater
adherence to smoking bans. The results warrant confirmation by quantitative analyses. Policies with mandated
inspections and penalty requirements that are implemented in all bars without prejudice could lead to greater
adherence to smoking bans. Positive reinforcing consequences that encourage adherence (such as publicity and
support from non-smokers) would be more likely to generate both greater adherence to the policy and good will
toward the government. Principles of behavior outlined in the BEM offer guidance for designing quantitative
confirmation analyses of future bans.
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Many countries have enacted laws banning smoking in
public places as part of their strategies to decrease the ill
effects of smoking. This strategy has reduced smoking
and levels of exposure to second-hand smoke (SHS) in
many countries [1-3]. In recent years some countries
and cities have banned smoking in pubs and bars (P&B),
further reducing exposure to SHS [2,4-8].* Correspondence: ornaepel@research.haifa.ac.il
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumIn 1983, a law banning smoking in public places in
Israel was enacted and amendments to the basic law
were added over the years. The latest amendment came
into effect on November 7, 2007, adding P&B to the list
of public places in which smoking is prohibited, except
in designated areas, when they exist. This amendment
placed the responsibility of enforcing the smoking bans
on the proprietors and the smoking patrons. Proprietors
are fined 5000 NIS, about $1250, and the smoking
patrons are fined about $300. Rosen and associates [9]
measured respirable small particles (RSP) in P&B and
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was about 10 times higher than in countries with en-
forcement of smoking bans and similar to countries
without enforced smoking bans. After the enactment of
the law, these authors reported that while the levels
decreased somewhat, they were still very high according
to EPA standards, especially in Tel-Aviv [10]. As levels
of smoking in P&B seem to be high, even after enact-
ment of the ban on smoking in these settings, it is im-
portant to understand the conditions that determine the
effectiveness or non-effectiveness of a ban.
The Behavior Ecological Model (BEM) was developed
to extend the theory based on conditioning of behavior
to explanations of group and population practices
[11,12]. As an individual’s health is usually a function of
the behavior of many people on multiple levels (individ-
ual, community, and national), a broader systems ap-
proach to understanding the individual and population
behavior is critical to identifying ways to improve health
associated with the behavior of large groups and whole
populations. Complex systems of behavior of subgroups
within the overall population operate to influence com-
plex behavioral and health outcomes. Systems influen-
cing behavior take place at the individual level of
analysis, family and peer network levels, and at larger
community and even international levels. The BEM relies
on concepts and principles of behavior in which reward-
ing or punishing consequences that immediately and reli-
ably follow a given behavior influences the adoption of
the behavior [13,14]. Causes of behaviors are to be found
in the environment external to the phenomenon to be
explained. Such contingencies (defined as a situation de-
termining a behavior) either increase or decrease future
behavior, depending on the power of the reward and
other context factors [11,12].
These contingencies of reinforcements define complex
ecological social systems that may predict and might in-
form new policies and other interventions to establish
population-wide health practices, including no smoking
policies in public places [11,12]. This model seems ap-
propriate for the complex issues of smoking in P&B as it
focuses on both the individual's behavior and on popula-
tions and individuals that have an influence on indivi-
duals, such as bar owners and local authorities. Other
models such as the Health Belief Model or the Theory of
Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior do not encom-
pass all levels of society that are needed to cope with
complex behavioral issues such as the ban on smoking
in P&B. These models relate to the individual and inter-
personal levels of society. Hovell and Hughes [11] sug-
gest that successful use of the BEM to formulate
effective policies, together with effective enforcement to
protect nonsmokers from SHS exposure, could lead to
the eradication of most tobacco smoking.Hovell and Hughes [11] have interpreted the BEM to
suggest how social norms may be changed by restricting
smoking in public settings and how this might also
markedly change social norms with respect to tolerating
tobacco smoke. One of the most important themes in
their paper suggests that cumulative regulations that in-
creasingly limit micro-environments where smoking is
allowed will lead to less smoking and an increase in the
population’s intolerance of smoking in all environments.
The anecdotal reports of low levels of enforcement of
the law banning smoking in P&B in Israel serves as an
interesting social context to study possible social contin-
gencies that may explain relative adherence or non-
adherence to bans in P&B, and may help develop
policies that will ensure greater adherence to such bans.
Methods
Study design
Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted
with 36 P&B owners during January to August 2010.
This study is part of a larger study assessing factors in-
fluencing the implementation of the ban on smoking in
P&B in Israel, such as levels of airborne nicotine in the
bars, the bar's environment, attitudes of the clients in
the bars, and attitudes of local authority officials.
At this point in time the factors that influence P&B
owners’ adoption or non-adoption of the law were un-
known; thus it was necessary to identify these issues in a
qualitative study before being able to measure them in a
quantitative study.
Thirteen P&B owners were from P&B in Tel-Aviv
(a large metropolitan city in Israel); the other 23 P&B
owners were from 18 towns around Israel. In Tel-Aviv
the competition between bars is substantial; however in
the smaller towns there is very little competition. In
Tel-Aviv, the P&B were chosen randomly in order to
gain representation of various types of bars. Bars in the
other towns were chosen first by identifying towns with
20,000 to 220,000 residents having a majority of Jews,
and with P&B in their jurisdiction. Arab towns were not
included as P&B are not a common venue for entertain-
ment among Muslims as alcohol is not allowed. The
selected group included 32 towns; however, only 29 were
included in the large study as three towns were near the
Gaza strip, which at that time were unsafe to visit. Most
towns had only one or two bars and the choice of towns
and bars for the final interviews were based on conveni-
ence. However, the realized sample includes more than
half of all the towns eligible for the study. Seven inter-
views were not completed due to failure to find the
owner, refusal, or postponements of appointments. A
total of 36 interviews were completed.
Each interview took 20 minutes to an hour, depending
on the willingness of the bar owners to share their




Mean age 32 years
Range 23–47
Gender Male 32 (89%)
Female 4 (11%)
Smoking status Present smokers 20 (56%)
Past smokers 3 (8%)
Never smoked 13 (36%)
Self report of ban
enforcement in
the bar/pub
Enforce the ban 14 (39%)
Partially enforce the ban 6 (17%)
Do not enforce the ban 16 (44%)
Size of town or
city where the
bar/pub is located
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tential interviewees were approached by phone or in the
bar; the aims of the study were explained and a date was
made for the interview. The interviews were transcribed
verbatim from recordings or transcribed during the
interview. Some interviewees refused to be recorded;
however we do not think this biased the data as similar
themes and categories were identified in both types of
interviews. A topic guide led the interviewee through
the issues for discussion. The guide addressed such
issues as smoking status of the bar owner, age, type of
P&B, attitudes towards the ban on smoking in P&B,
what the policy of the pub was regarding smoking, ex-
perience with enforcement of the law, experiences with
patrons related to the law, and how they cope with the
patrons and the authorities. The sample size was reached
after no new themes or categories were identified.
The study received approval from Haifa University’s
ethics committee before beginning the interviews.
Analysis
Data were analyzed according to the guidelines of Unrau
[15]: the text was divided into meaningful units, its cat-
egories were identified, and finally the data were
explained and interpreted. Three of the authors read the
transcripts and each team member coded and organized
the data to identify key categories. The lists of categories
were compared, and any inconsistencies were resolved by
a review of the data and then reaching agreement
through discussion. The researchers then reread all the
transcripts and found the themes running through the
interviews [16]. The same process was used to obtain a
consistent list of themes. The BEM was used as the con-
ceptual framework for which categories and themes were
interpreted to arrive at plausible hypotheses explaining
the continued smoking in P&B in the context of a ban on
such behavior. Categories were divided by the hierarchy
of contingencies that reinforced the behavior of smoking
in P&B; if the category reinforced smoking in P&B gener-
ally in the whole society it was categorized as such, and if
it reinforced smoking in a specific P&B it was classified
as belonging to the local level, and so forth.
Results
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the 36 P&B owners
interviewed. The mean age was 32 and 89% of the owners
were men; over half of the owners smoked. The P&B own-
ers were from small to large towns; 44% of the P&B own-
ers did not hesitate to report that they did not enforce the
law. Most of the remaining implied that they sometimes
adhered to the law by enforcing it “as best they could”.
Table 2 depicts the themes and categories by hierarchy
for which we analyzed the interviews. The two main
themes that emerged were: 1. Financial and socialreinforcements and punishments for enforcing or not
enforcing the ban; and 2. Situations enhancing or prohi-
biting adopting the ban (contingencies).Financial and social reinforcements and punishments for
adopting the ban
Society level
The social perceptions of “having fun” in the P&B
The P&B owners think their clients expect a certain at-
mosphere in the P&B and do not want to be told what
to do when they are out having fun. Therefore, they
think the ban will change the atmosphere clients expect:
“This is some kind of an escape . . . it is not a spa or a
gym, people come here to drink, it is not a healthy place,
it’s an escape that symbolizes the anti-climax of health”
“People go out to a bar for a drink and smoke a
cigarette. They want to get away from the daily
routine for an hour or two . . . It’s the last place that
you can still have some fun these days . . .”
It seems that P&B serve to relax social and legal rules
about drinking and smoking in order for patrons to have
“fun”. This implies that owners may be criticized or lose
business if they penalize patrons for smoking.Community level
Local authorities are the law enforcers of the ban on
smoking in public places; their inspectors are expected
to enforce the law by giving fines.
Table 2 Themes and categories identified from interviews with the bar owners by hierarchy of contingencies
Themes Financial and social reinforcements for
punishments for adopting the ban
Situations enhancing or prohibiting
adopting the ban
Level of Hierarchy Category Category
1. Society level 1. The social perceptions of
“having fun” in the bar.
1. Banning smoking as a result of social criticism.
2. Reactions to social movements trying to enforce the law.
3. The disobedient Israeli customer.
2. Community level 1. Frequency of receiving fines. 1. Inconsistencies in inspectors’ behavior.
2. The courts as a non-supportive
organization environment.
3. Local level 1. The bar’s losses and gains
in enforcing the ban.
1. Inconsistencies in adherence to the ban.
4. Individual level 2. Problems in the built environment
preventing adherence with the ban.
1. Patrons’ reactions to smoking in P&B.
2. The bar owner’s role as the enforcer of the ban.
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The P&B owners reported different levels of law en-
forcement depending on the local authorities. Many
P&B owners reported no inspections of the B&P.
“You can’t see enforcement in Israel at all.”
“The inspectors go to sleep after 12.30, they don’t
work on Saturday”
On the other hand there were P&B that reported
having being fined:
“In (name of town) the law is enforced; there are
inspectors and they enforce it mainly in my bar! I am
located near the city hall . . . so they start and finish
their rounds here.”
One bar owner said:
“The inspectors come every day, they drive me crazy.”
P&B owners had the option to call the city hall’s call
center and complain if clients smoke in the bar; this
served as a way to get round a fine if the inspector came.
However one bar owner said:
“I called the call center and asked them to send an
inspector when the law just came out, but as time
went on they ignored my calls and stopped coming,
so we stopped calling.”
The low level of inspection and financial penalties
made it unlikely that the “no smoking” ban would be
enforced. Theoretically, inconsistent punitive contingen-
cies generate gambling and may have inadvertently
increased the probability of non-adherence to the law.
Moreover, the possibility of a wide-spread impressionthat the law was enforced in a prejudicial or an unfair
manner might lead to a thwarting of the law or even
overt counter-aggression.
The courts as a non-supportive organizational environment
The P&B owners described situations where they were
sued; however, the courts did not penalize them with
large fines. On the contrary, they were fined for low
sums of money or did not appear in court at all.
"Twice I was taken to court, once it somehow ended
and once I lost the case but the judge said they can’t
be greedy and I was fined only 150 shekels (around
$50), even though I was sued for thousands of
shekels."
"They close the case for 'no interest to the public';
they do not take the case to trial so it will not turn
into a precedent."
These reports suggest that there is no overall social
agreement as to the enforcement of the law; the courts
do not back the individuals or organizations that try and
enforce the law, while the local authorities refrain from
fully inspecting the P&B.Local level
The bar's losses and gains in enforcing the ban
Financial losses for enforcing the law Some of the
P&B owners reported real or perceived financial losses
due to loss of clients when trying to enforce the law.
". . . as a bar that was founded before the law we had a
30% decrease in revenues . . ."
"People come in and say: What? You can’t smoke
here? and they leave."
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will decrease."
Some P&B owners reported financial losses due to the
fines they had to pay:
"We paid 15,000 shekel (about $5000) already . . .
that’s a lot of money."
Gains in enforcing the law
A few P&B owners who enforce the law at least partially,
said that clients who do not want to suffer from SHS
come to their bar, and they are rewarded when the cli-
ents praise them for a clean air P&B. In addition, having
a "clean bar" brings in a specific set of patrons:
"I hear mainly positive remarks, especially from the
girls, 'It is so good not to stink when we go home, no
need to wash your hair' . . ."
". . . we market the bar as a non-smokers bar so we
get non-smoking clients."
Both losses and gains serve as reinforcement of the be-
havior adopted by the P&B. P&B not enforcing the law
perceive not losing clients and revenues as reinforcement
for not enforcing the law, while those enforcing the law
perceive the satisfaction of the non-smokers as
reinforcement for adhering to the law.
Situations enhancing or prohibiting adopting the ban
(contingencies)
Society level
Banning smoking as a result of social criticism P&B
that served food during the day and the early hours of
the evening reported implementing the law when their
main business was food. Later in the evening they did
not enforce the law. This implies that they adapted their
establishment to a specific social contingency:
"There is a separation between noon and night;
during the day there is no smoking also outside. I had
a problem with families during the day, that’s why it
turned into non-smoking (establishment). We go by
the norm, and tailor for our target population."
These comments suggest that social criticism and risk
to their business was driving their enforcement of the
“no smoking” ban for food services in the daytime but
not for drinkers in the evening.
Reactions to social movements trying to enforce the law
Some P&B owners in Tel-Aviv mentioned an
organization called "Clean Air", an NGO founded by law
students who advocate for smoke-free public places,
mainly P&B. This NGO is active only in Tel-Aviv. Theirmembers usually go to P&B, take pictures of smoking
clients, and sue the P&B. The P&B owners said that
most of their appearances in court due to smoking were
instigated by this organization. However, the judges were
not pro "Clean Air". This organization was perceived by
the P&B owners as "informers" and "anti social":
"It is obvious that their intentions are not pure, the
person comes with a camera and harasses people . . ."
"The judges don't like them (Clean Air)."
As they perceive these activities are not backed by the
various institutions, such as the courts, the P&B owners
did not report trying to enforce the law due to the
NGO's activity. P&B owners in the other towns did not
mention such organizations.
The disobedient Israeli customer
During the interviews comparisons to the ban on smok-
ing in P&B in other countries came up and the P&B
owners tried to explain why it was so hard to implement
it in Israel. In their opinion the Israeli client is "problem-
atic": they thought it was impossible to make Israelis
change their behavior and obey the law; the law will not
prevent the patrons from doing what they want to do.
This is seen as a social norm among Israelis.
". . .people do not listen, they just light the cigarette
later (after being told not to smoke); even next to the
inspector they go on smoking."
This perception of the disobedient Israeli may serve as an
excuse for not enforcing the law, but it may also be possible
that Israelis perceive themselves as oppositional to laws and
do not appreciate criticism of their smoking practices.
Community level
Inconsistencies in inspectors’ behavior
In Tel–Aviv, where there are over 150 P&B and there is
fierce competition, the P&B owners complained of un-
equal enforcement of the law by the authorities. In the
opinion of P&B owners, the inspectors preferred to in-
spect certain areas and certain types of establishments
but not others. These P&B owners felt they faced unfair
competition with other P&B where the law was not
enforced, and where the competition was not fined or
sued. The bar owners expressed high levels of frustration:
"The law is enforced where it is convenient for
them . . ."
"They are terrible, they are bad at anything they do, I
don't even know where to start. The inspection
division (in city hall) is run like the mafia, with
revenge on a personal level, they bother the weak, and
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the problem? When you want to, you can!"
". . . once a month they (the inspectors) come and we
get fined . . . I have not heard of anyone else in the
area getting fined . . ."
The unequal enforcement may lead to non-adherence
with the smoking bans.
Local level
Inconsistencies in adherence to the ban
Bar owners complained of nearby bars where clients can
smoke:
"My neighbor (a bar) does not enforce the law, so I
have no financial interest in enforcing the law . . ."
These reports emphasize the importance of a total ban
in all bars; this is crucial when trying to achieve compli-
ance with the law, as previously mentioned.
Problems in the built environment preventing adherence
with the ban
Some of the P&B owners complained that technically they
cannot have smoking areas; thereby making it harder for
them to compete with bars that have smoking areas:
"Our place is a studio. We cannot separate it for
smokers and non-smokers so we let the customers
smoke in the whole area . . . we can't do anything
about it . . ."
If a P&B is non-smoking, the clients will smoke out-
side the bar; however, in a residential area the bar own-
ers are at risk of getting their permit taken away as they
are disturbing the residents by having people make noise
outside on the sidewalk:
"If I send him (the client) to smoke outside I am
taking a risk of getting fined for disturbing the
neighbors, and that puts my license at risk; smoking
in the bar is just a fine, it does not put the whole
business at risk."
They also thought that when smokers had to go out-
side to smoke the place looked empty and the atmos-
phere was negatively affected.
Individual level
Patron's reactions to smoking in bars
The P&B owners reported that only infrequently did cli-
ents complain about smoking or told other people in the
bar to stop smoking.
"Only a few times I heard clients comment about the
smoking; usually they do not complain."P&B owners had stories of policemen and inspectors
who smoked in the bar; this presented a negative role
model for the public.
". . . a few days ago a policeman came in and smoked
. . . when there is no enforcement there is no
enforcement."
The bar owner's role as the enforcer of the ban
The law created a situation in which instead of being a
host, the bar owner perceives himself as a "policeman".
This puts him in very difficult situations with clients.
". . . the law turns me into a policeman . . . I can't be a
policeman . . ."
"The bar owners' job is to make a bar fun, not to be a
policeman."
"I won't be the bad guy . . ."
It seems that the P&B owners have no intention of
taking on the role of law enforcement.
Discussion
International bans on smoking in P&B
Involuntary smoking is known as the third highest risk
factor for mortality throughout the world, causing cancer,
heart disease, and severe and chronic respiratory diseases
[17-19]. A smoke-free policy banning smoking in public
places is the most efficient strategy to reduce involuntary
smoking and to eliminate the ill effects of SHS [1,20,21].
In most developed countries there are policies that ban
smoking in certain public places; in some countries the
ban is comprehensive and in others it is partial [18]. It
seems that a total ban is more effective than a partial ban
[1,22]. Ireland was the first country to ban smoking in all
public places including P&B; this was the last public set-
ting to prohibit smoking as alcohol and smoking were
perceived as associated behaviors [4,23,24]. Other coun-
tries followed and studies show a large decrease in SHS in
the P&B after enactment of the bans [6,22,24,25].
Studies also compared P&B in countries with total
bans and countries without bans on smoking in P&B.
The levels of airborne nicotine in the P&B in countries
with the bans were 93% lower than in countries that do
not ban smoking in P&B [22]. Most countries imple-
menting these bans have been successful; however, not
all. For example, in Poland and the Slovak Republic air-
borne nicotine was still not very low [24]. In Australia,
before banning smoking in P&B Carter & Chapman [26]
reported that laypeople considered smoking in bars "nat-
ural" and thought venues would fight bans; this was
expressed more frequently by smokers. However, Cooper
et al. [27] found that smokers readily comply and sup-
ported smoke-free bars after enactment of the law. In
Greece, young people were cynical about government
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Israel, it seems that even though a law banning smoking
in P&B was enacted, not all establishments adhere to it
[9,10]. In the annual report to the Knesset (Israel parlia-
ment) towns were asked to report on their law enforce-
ment. Forty-one towns reported on the number of fines
given out because of smoking in public places; in
Tel-Aviv 1343 fines were given out in 2010, and in the
other 40 towns another 2,244 fines were issued [29].
Comparatively, this is a relatively small number of fines,
implying a low level of law enforcement in Israel.
Analysis using the BEM
Analysis of the P&B owners' narratives may help us under-
stand how social norms regarding smoking in P&B may be
changed by altering contingencies of reinforcement using
the BEM.
Situations in which reinforcements and punishments
promote enforcing the law in the P&B by the owners
were identified for each level of hierarchy in society. This
includes the society, community, local, and individual
levels, which form a synergy determining the actions of
the P&B owners. In this way it may be possible to develop
a society with norms that are not tolerant of smoking in
public places and where society will provide social repri-
mands that will prevent the smokers from smoking in
public places. Hofstetter and colleagues [30] suggested it
is plausible that the presence of policies banning smoking
will function as motivating reprimands and sanctions
from non-smokers towards the smokers, and will help de-
velop a non-smoking society. However, to start the
process more substantively in Israel, it may be necessary
to strengthen laws and their universal enforcement.
According to the P&B owners' narratives, the various
levels of hierarchies in society provide contingencies and
reinforcements for not enforcing the law and do not
provide substantial punishments.
From the narratives two main categories of reinforce-
ments and punishments can be identified and each has
various contingencies defining the behaviors. The main
reinforcement or punishment is financial: receiving fines
from the local authorities' inspectors, losing in courts when
being sued, and loss of customers who want to smoke.
The second is the social reinforcement and punishment.
Financial reinforcement or punishment
Infrequent and inconsistent inspections result in a lack
of effective reinforcements and punishments, which can
be the result of different reasons, such as not enough
funding for inspectors, or low priority within the local
authority. In addition, the inspectors may use their
power unfairly and/or for personal gain, even for ven-
geance, as suggested by one bar owner. Infrequent and
inconsistent inspection generates serious dissatisfactionwith the no smoking law and criticism of the authorities,
discouraging any attempt to fully enforce the law. Inter-
mittent reinforcement can sustain behavior indefinitely.
However, typically unreliable punishment does not re-
duce rates of unlawful behavior. Sometimes it strength-
ens behavior due to intermittent reinforcement. The net
picture provided by our interviews suggests very limited
penalties for smoking in P&B, making such procedures
unlikely to suppress smoking. The reported Infrequent
and inconsistent inspections of the P&B may imply that
if they would perceive the inspection as consistent, en-
forcement of the law would be possible.
Laws that depend on penalties should also have rela-
tively large fines that increase with repeated offenses.
However, because inspectors are uncomfortable assign-
ing high cost penalties, they will require training and
supervision to ensure the universal application of penal-
ties when earned. It is important to increase the know-
ledge of inspectors regarding the hazards of SHS and to
convince them that they are saving lives when they
execute a fine.
Support for these findings can be obtained from the
annual report to the Knesset regarding the low number
of fines given [29], which implies a low level of law en-
forcement, correlating with the P&B owners’ reports.
Environments that were non-supportive of the finan-
cial penalties were identified. For example, the judicial
courts did not support suing the P&B; therefore, laws
should not allow judges to depreciate the use of the law
in general or the level of penalty. Another unsuccessful
contingency on the society level was the "Clean Air"
organization. From the reaction to the social movement
"Clean Air", it seems that the P&B owners do not under-
stand the reasons why this social movement exists; their
narrative implies that they think the aim of "Clean Air"
is somehow to profit financially. It seems also that this
organization misses the point they are trying to make, as
their "harassment" of the P&B does not induce the im-
plementation of the non-smoking policy. This fits the
cultural contingency model that Hovell et al. [12] have
proposed as powerful at the society level.
The P&B owners also think that smoking increases al-
cohol consumption; therefore a smoking ban will cause
patrons to order less alcohol. These issues have not usu-
ally been found to be true in formal studies [31-33]. In
addition, the fact that the bar owners think that there
will always be a nearby bar where clients can smoke pre-
vents them from enforcing the law, as they presume that
clients will prefer a bar that does not enforce the law. Of
course this is mainly true for P&B that have competition
nearby. It seems that the P&B owners' perceptions and
emotional reactions to risks of loss of income are more
powerful than evidence to the contrary. Their perception
of the issue seems to be preventing them from enacting
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that new laws are well advertised and social marketing
techniques adapted, and that all P&B that break the law
consistently experience the same penalty.
The P&B owners' perceptions that most patrons are
smokers inhibit them from analyzing the situation more
accurately. In Israel, as in most countries, there are more
nonsmokers than smokers (even among those who fre-
quent bars) [34,35]. This suggests that the P&B who
cater to non-smokers could earn more than from smo-
kers. However, many nonsmokers appear to put up with
the smoke because they otherwise can’t go anywhere to
enjoy an evening out and do not shun P&B not enfor-
cing the ban.
Social reinforcements and punishments
Social reinforcements and punishments and situations
that provide these reinforcements can be identified at all
levels of analysis. For example, on the society level, subsets
of customers do not want to eat or drink in the presence
of smoke. This has reinforced the P&B owners’ adherence
with the law to restrict smoking during early hours of op-
eration. In the evening when patrons come only to drink
the P&B owner relaxes the ban. This discrimination on
the part of some owners is most informative and shows
that owners do respond to the wishes of their customers.
It suggests that the complaints and/or loss of business by
subsets of the public have led to changes in P&B owners'
enforcement of the law in their P&B. It is possible for fi-
nancial and social contingencies to alter the owners’ en-
forcement of policies. However, on the other hand, the
P&B owners said that P&B are for patrons to have a good
time, enjoy the music, drinks, and company; this includes
both alcohol and smoking. This implies a complex and
subtle reinforcer and contingency. With a ban, the P&B
owner must criticize some customers when asking them
to stop smoking and this probably makes the customers
uncomfortable. Thus, the implied fines in existence may
not be enough to make it worth the risk for bar owners to
enforce the law, given the social penalties that might take
place, such as detracting from the desired atmosphere in
the P&B. On the individual level, it seems that the non-
smokers present very little reinforcement for adopting a
non-smoking policy in the P&B, as in the evening they are
less inclined to express their dissatisfaction when the P&B
allows smoking.
Specific contingencies
Contingencies that support or prevent the enforcement
of the ban were identified for the different hierarchies of
society. One such social contingency mentioned by P&B
owners was the disobedient Israeli; the owners do not
want to confront the smokers as it may bring on nega-
tive reactions by the patrons. The notion that the statelaws can be bypassed and the system can be beaten has
been discussed and studied by various scholars in Israel.
Sprinzak [36] suggests that the disobedience in the
Israeli society stems from the Jews having spent centur-
ies in the Diaspora, where they viewed the laws as alien.
"Beating" or "bashing" the system is regarded as norma-
tive in certain groups. The issue was discussed and em-
pirically studied [37]. For example, Rattner et al. [38]
studied three groups of Israelis: Ultra-orthodox Jews,
settlers in the occupied territories, and Israeli Arabs.
They suggested a model predicting willingness to take
the law into one's hands, where commitment to the law,
perception of procedural justice, and alienation were the
independent variables.
However, this does not mean laws cannot be enforced;
they do need strong and consistent enforcement to-
gether with large social marketing campaigns as
described for prevention of road accidents [39] and
smoking bans in other countries [4,5]. Implementation
of the ban on smoking should not depend on the P&B
owners, and law enforcement cannot be left to them
with no reinforcements for their actions.
Another such contingency that the bar owners men-
tioned was the fact that the law does not take into ac-
count specific problems they have that prevent them
from having smoking areas such as small and old bars;
these may be serious problems that should be addressed
in refined policies.
Conclusions
The lack of consistent use of various punishments and
reinforcers inhibit the implementation of the ban on
smoking in P&B in Israel. From the owners' narratives it
seems that consistent and equal inspection of the P&B,
in addition to the backing of the judicial courts, together
with a campaign targeting the non-smokers with a mes-
sage that they are entitled to a smoke-free environment
in all public places including P&B could change social
norms. Social norms could be supportive of not smoking
in P&B and other public places. It seems that the P&B
owners have a constant conflict of interest; on one hand
they would like to be law abiding citizens, but on the
other hand, abiding the law brings with it too many pun-
ishments that do not increase the likelihood of enforcing
the law. At this point in time, the reinforcers for not
implementing the ban are more influential than the pun-
ishments at all levels of social hierarchy.
When the law was enacted, the P&B owners were
expected to comply with the law. Some prior educational
information regarding the law was communicated via
the radio and direct mailing to P&B owners; however
little information regarding how to tackle the problems
that would arise was given. No budget was allocated to
the local authorities (the city halls) for the enforcement
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forcement of the law was only partially successful with
about half of P&B owners reporting not enforcing the
law at all.
Recommendation
Interventions including social marketing campaigns
could encourage clients to request no-smoking enforce-
ment in bars; this could bring owners to be more
inclined to enforce the ban and more concerned that
failure to adhere would cost them clients. This might be
constructed in the context of ads that make clear that
the majority of adults do not smoke and do not like eat-
ing or drinking in a smoke-filled bar, and that the major-
ity should have the right to be protected from harm
caused by a minority.
These policies are now in need of more formal and
quantitative evaluation to extend the present qualitative
study. As this is a qualitative study, the generalizability of
the results is not clear, and the prevalence of the factors
identified has not yet been quantified, even though a
large number of towns and P&B were sampled. Further
studies should try to understand why some P&B owners
more than others implement the ban, using quantitative
methodology, and why authorities have not enforced the
law more vigorously. There is also a need to follow
trends in smoking in P&B and quantitatively identify fac-
tors that can predict these changes. Deeper understand-
ing of these factors may help implement more precise
tobacco control policies. As smoking has generally
decreased in Israel during the last few decades, it is pos-
sible to change social norms and behaviors in this society
and prevent the morbidity and mortality due to smoking
and SHS [34]. Lessons can be learned from this study on
how to implement bans on smoking in Israel and in other
countries based on the Israeli experience.
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